Introduction
Guatemalan security forces killed an estimated 200,000 people during that country"s 30-year internal conflict. Most of those responsible for these crimes remain hidden behind a stubborn wall of impunity. In one episode, on July 18, 1982, Guatemalan military and para-military personnel slaughtered 268 civilians. The massacre took place in Plan de Sanchez and surrounding communities where "soldiers randomly picked their victims, raping and torturing young women before rounding up villagers in a house, throwing in hand grenades and firing machines guns." 1 Most of the 268 victims were Mayan. For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those responsible for this massacre.
As nations work to democratize and liberalize after periods of intense conflict, how can they confront this history of brutal human rights atrocities? How can their recurrence be prevented? While traditional Anglo-American democratic theory suggests that an independent judiciary is the institution ideally suited to hold the government accountable to the law, in this essay we will consider whether international courts are necessary to help post-conflict nations confront their past and democratize. By looking at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), we examine whether international courts can effectively promote human rights accountability and protection, and if so to what extent. Human rights scholarship is perhaps at its most revealing when the analysis is coupled with the human story from which the legal and political issues arise.
Therefore, our analysis will orbit around the case studies of the Mack, Carpio and Plan de Sanchez trials from Guatemala. 2 Guatemala is an ideal subject of analysis for this essay because it is emerging from 30 years of political violence. It has suffered some of the most horrific human rights violations in the region and it is now struggling to reconcile this past and embrace liberal democracy. It has one of the worst human rights records in Latin America according to observers like Amnesty International and the U.S.
State Department, and thus it is a monumentally challenging case. 3 To uncover answers to our questions we first provide a brief history of Guatemala.
We then consider the role of courts in the struggle for human rights, demonstrating the need for international judicial action. Accompanying this section, we include a discussion of the purpose of international courts. Then after a brief introduction to the Inter-American human rights system and our three case studies, we examine whether and how the IACHR accomplishes the purpose of an international human rights tribunal.
Finally, drawing on lessons from the analysis, we conclude that international courts, and specifically the Inter-American Court, can indeed promote human rights. We base analysis on interviews with lawyers and activists working in the area, on our observation of proceedings before the IACHR, and on the content analysis of IACHR decisions. 4 
Historical Background
Guatemala has a deeply tragic history of political violence and wide spread human rights violations with causes traceable to its colonial roots. In an effort to break with years of the repression, stratification and exploitation of the colonial and postcolonial regimes, Guatemala elected populists presidents in the two elections following World War II. Dr. Juan José Arévalo and his successor Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman embraced land reform and encouraged broader political participation. However, in 1954, when President Arbenz"s reform efforts were perceived as harming U.S. interests, the Central Intelligence Agency helped Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas overthrow Arbenz. In order to consolidate power and reverse the political opening of the Arévalo and Arbenz regimes, the Armas government strengthened the state security apparatus extending it to the rural areas. For more than 40 years this security apparatus has been brutally repressing opposition in whatever form it appeared -supporters of land reform, the labor movement and the rural insurgency. In 1978 when General Romeo Lucas Garcia became president he first targeted political opposition in the urban centers and later the labor movement and insurgency in the countryside. Then after taking power in a coup in 1982
General Efrain Rios Montt launched a bloody scorched earth anti-insurgency campaign.
Most of the male peasants were conscripted into civil patrols and tens of thousands of innocent Guatemalans and combatants were killed. 5 In 1983 General Oscar Mejia Victores overthrew Rios Montt and began a painstakingly slow process of democratization. However, this promising step did not coincide with the cessation of violence as the military continued its bloody antiinsurgency campaign. Despite a relatively successful democratic power transition in 1986 the civilian governments were unable to wrest meaningful authority from the military.
However, there are still monumental obstacles to improving human rights conditions and to achieving justice for human rights violations.
The Role of Courts

A. Legal Accountability
In the face of the legacy of catastrophic political violence, victims frequently look to the courts to reconstruct the rule of law and provide justice. According to many human rights activists and scholars, courts must act to consolidate democratic reform based upon the rule of law in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings. 13 As Fletcher and Weinstein argue, "Accountability provides a direct, moral, and ethical response to victims on behalf of society that demonstrates that the state is validating their innocence and their lack of culpability in the deeds." 14 By punishing those responsible, the state recognizes the suffering of the victims and issues a moral condemnation of the actions committed. 15 As Jamie Mayerfeld writes, punishment "communicates society"s condemnation of [the] violation, and helps actual and potential aggressors to absorb the lesson that such violation is morally wrong." 16 Courts address the victims" desire for retribution by punishing individual defendants and in so doing may also serve to protect against future violations. 17 Mayerfeld argues that, "the obligation to deter constitutes the core rationale for punishing human rights violations." 18 Yet another scholar, Jennifer
Widner, points out that by punishing violators, courts can provide a credible threat that future violations will be punished as well. 19 In order to guarantee human rights in the present, past threats to punish must be carried out. 20 Indeed, according to Mayerfeld, effective judicial dispute resolution systems "encourage social reconciliation by modeling a fair procedure for the just disposition of violent conflicts fueled by bitter political and ideological divisions." 21 
B. Judicial Independence and Accountability
Scholars and activists frequently urge judicial independence and reform in order to establish a domestic institution capable of holding government accountable to the rule of law. 27 The result, in theory, is an independent court system at home that can check tyranny from the other political institutions. Judicial independence can be defined as the extent to which the members of a court may adjudicate free from institutional controls, incentives, and impediments imposed by other political institutions or forces. 28 In
Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states that "the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order to, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." 29 According to Hamilton, the independence of the judiciary operates as a "safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society." 30 As Charles Epp states in his comparative study, "the judicial system"s structural independence . . . is widely recognized as a necessary condition for any significant judicial check on arbitrary power." 31 Independence would seem to be especially important if courts are to hold government officials accountable for past or on-going violations of human rights. In a comparison of the U.S. and Canadian high courts, Miller discovered the U.S. Supreme
Court was more likely to challenge other branches because it possessed more autonomy than its Canadian counterpart. 32 Comparative scholars have consistently recognized the importance of judicial independence in democratization, protecting individual rights and promoting the rule of law. 33 Dodson and Jackson linked the impotence of the judiciary directly to human rights violations in Guatemala and El Salvador.
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Thomas Jefferson differed with Hamilton"s view of judicial independence, however, arguing that judges "should be submitted to some practical and impartial control." 35 He observed that "[a]ll know the influence of interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence." 36 Critics of absolute judicial autonomy "object to what they consider to be an inordinate and constitutionally unjustifiable grant of power to the branch of government which is least likely to accurately represent the genuine will of the people." 37 For example, Mark Tushnet argues that granting judges independence encourages them to follow their political will and not necessarily their legal judgment. 38 Michael Collins points out that an independent court "could itself engage in acts of constitutional usurpation that might be difficult to remedy." 39 It is possible, then, that the traditional pillars of judicial independence could, in some circumstances, impede human rights accountability. Ratner and Abrams argue that, "Accountability cannot be isolated from the political dynamic in which competing factions within states seek to manipulate the past in order to justify both their prior activities and the current programs." 40 In repressive states, judges abetting tyranny could continue to do so unencumbered by the constraints of democratic accountability.
Independence can only free courts from unwanted influence, it cannot grant judges the will to confront decades of impunity, nor can it anoint them with the wisdom to overcome legislatively or constitutionally rooted opposition to accountability. Judges will, after all, always be bound to the political elite at least to some degree and as Ratner and Abrams articulate, "the most critical reason for the lack of prosecutions…is that serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law are usually committed on behalf of or with the complicity of the state." 41 In addition to judicial ties to state actors, the barriers maintaining impunity include doctrines of sovereign immunity and amnesty laws, both of which are raised and maintained by the state.
In new and unstable democracies the prosecution of human rights cases can actually destabilize the democratic government and harm the cause of accountability.
Ratner and Abrams point out that "if a nation"s leaders allow the prosecutions to become a pawn in the competition for power, the trials will lack credibility and damage the foundations of democracy." 42 44 The families sought justice for the killings in Guatemala but Judge after judge refused to hear the case. Guatemalan trial and appellate courts twisted the law to block all efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the killings. 45 Throughout the more than ten years of investigation numerous crucial pieces of evidence have been lost, mislabeled and otherwise destroyed. 46 Despite a report prepared by a chief prosecutor implicating 11 members of a civil defense patrol in the murders only four of these men were tried and only one was convicted of the crime. Moreover, this conviction came in 1996 after three years of dilatory tactics by the defense and by the trial courts. In an additional blow, the trial court refused to consider the role of the civil defense patrol and no notable progress has occurred since that time. 47 The result was an utter destruction of any belief in justice emanating from the democratizing state. As the wife of one of the victims, Silvia Villacorta, testified before the Inter-American Court, "Guatemala is a country of deep wounds and shallow justice" 48 The wife of Jorge Carpio, Mrs. Arrivillaga de Carpio, recounted the utter failure of the justice system in Guatemala and told the Inter-American Court that, as a result, she lived each day in fear. 49 "I felt unprotected," she testified. 50 The state obstructed all efforts to pursue truth and justice in the neither justice nor any results of that process. The violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the indigenous peoples and farmers impede justice.
Until this day there are still threats against any judge involved in the case." Mack"s clothing and fingernail samples were initially retained, they were discarded before any laboratory analysis was conducted on them. A report drafted by investigators suggesting that Guatemalan security forces planned and carried out the murder was destroyed. When one of these investigators testified about this report he was assassinated. 53 In addition to legal and procedural obstructions those wishing to preserve impunity launched a violent campaign against anyone working on the Mack case. In
April 1994 the president of Guatemala"s Constitutional Court, Epaminondas González Dubón, was shot and killed. At the time of the murder the Court was considering several controversial human rights cases, including preliminary rulings on the Myrna Mack case. 54 Throughout the more than 10 years of judicial proceedings death threats have driven more than ten judges to drop the case. Several judges, prosecutors and witnesses have fled the country after receiving death threats. In July 1994, Helen Mack was forced to leave Guatemala after a plan to murder her was exposed. The next month Roberto Romero, a Myrna Mack Foundation lawyer, fled the country after assailants fired at him. 55 In an interview, an activist working in Guatemala reported that she has personal knowledge of judges and prosecutors who suffer "harassment, threats . . . in a lot of cases their families have been threatened, they"re harassed, some of them have suffered attacks and some have suffered pressure from within the system." duties to prosecute offenders." 59 They also recognize that these institutions can "establish an authoritative factual record" and "serve the cause of developing human rights and humanitarian law." 60 Minow argues that when a crime against humanity is "prosecuted outside the affected territory, in the absence of regime change, it is perhaps the purest illustration of the potential of law to effect normative transition . . . 
B. The Carpio Case
With all efforts to pursue justice at home blocked, Carpio"s wife, Martha 73 The Court ruled that the state, acting through para-militaries, murdered Carpio for political reasons and that it erected obstructions to justice resulting in "total impunity." 74 It went beyond a simple judgment that Carpio"s rights were violated, and ruled that the rights of all those threatened and attacked in their pursuit of justice in the case were also violated. 75 The reparations assigned by the Court in both cases reflect a desire to extend beyond compensation and take steps to remedy conditions in Guatemala. For example, in addition to money damages totaling $1,360,000 for the victims" families, the Court ordered the state to enact concrete measures to prevent similar violations and continued impunity.
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C. The Plan de Sanchez Case
Blocked by the same infrastructure of impunity in Guatemala, the victims of the Plan de Sanchez massacre filed their claim with the Inter-American Commission on May 11, 1999. As in the Carpio case, the petitioners argued and the Commission agreed that local remedies were unobtainable due to the wall of impunity erected by the state.
CALDH represented the victims and families before the Commission and before the IACHR.
In August, 2000, President Alfonso Portillo admitted "institutional responsibility"
for the Plan de Sanchez massacre during conciliation discussions between the state, the petitioners, and the Commission. 77 On February 28, 2002, the Commission, after analyzing the positions of both sides, made a series of recommendations to the state including a demand that the state conduct an investigation to identify and sanction those responsible for the massacre. 78 The Commission also required Guatemala to pay both material and nonmaterial compensation to the survivors of the massacre and to take measures to ensure that such an atrocity would never recur. Despite Portillo"s acceptance of responsibility, Guatemala failed to take the steps required by the Commission. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Plan de Sanchez victims were denied their rights to personal integrity, judicial protection, equality before the law, freedom of religion, property. 83 Moreover the state"s efforts to preserve impunity after the massacre violated the petitioners" rights to judicial protection. 84 The
Court awarded $20,000 per beneficiary in pecuniary damages totaling almost $7 million. 85 Moreover the Court ordered Guatemala to construct health care and mental health facilities in the Plan de Sanchez community as well as road, water and sewer systems. represented the victims and along with the Commission they put on evidence of the state"s responsibility for the murder, the repeated state efforts to obstruct the domestic proceedings and the tremendous toll Myrna Mack"s death had upon the lives of her family members. Myrna Mack"s daughter, who was 16 years old when her mother was killed, testified that she "thinks of her mother every day, especially of the way she was murdered, of the pain of the 27 knife wounds she suffered, and of how she must have felt lying alone on the street." Convention. 90 The IACHR ruled that the murder was planned and executed for political purposes as part of campaign to silence those who would expose Guatemalan human rights violations. 91 The Court also found that Guatemala had denied the Mack family the right to justice by covering up the crime and obstructing the judicial process through legal and violent means. 92 Finally, the Court ruled that Guatemala violated the Mack family"s rights to humane treatment by committing the murder and by using threats and coercion to impede the family"s attempts to pursue justice. 93 In addition to more than $600,000 in pecuniary damages divide among three family members, the Court required Guatemala to remove all obstacles to the domestic prosecution, to name a street after Myrna Mack and to create a permanent anthropology scholarship in Myrna Mack"s name.
These three cases present a typical formula for Guatemala. In each the state orchestrated a brutal human rights violation. In each the state deployed a multifaceted campaign to cover up the crime and obstruct all efforts to attain justice. And in each the litigants reached beyond the state, to the Inter-American Court, to escape the Guatemalan formula of injustice.
The IACHR and Human Rights Accountability
A. The Function of the IACHR
In their study of international courts, Posner and Yoo argue that the IACHR is ineffective because it hears few cases and compliance rates are low. 94 In their effort to In this piece we focus our assessment on whether the IACHR improves human rights conditions in the Americas, concentrating on one of the toughest challengesGuatemala. Drawing from the scholarship discussed above we identify four purposes of an international court that hears human rights cases from post-conflict democracies. (See Table 1 ). First, it should operate to deter future violations with rulings that "equip people to call for accountability." 96 Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral condemnation of human rights violations. 97 Third, its jurisprudence should transcend the parties in the case in order to express the normative value of justice and equality under the law to broad classes of victims. 98 Fourth, it should establish "knowledge of past actions committed under color of law" and create a historical record. 99 An overview of the IACHR"s jurisprudence demonstrates that, given the tribunal"s authority and resources, it has had some success.
[ advocates legal tools in their campaign for accountability. 110 For example, the Court rejects the contention that rights are "culturally relative" and instead holds them to be universal. 111 The IACHR fundamentally altered rights jurisprudence in the region when it held that human rights law was part of international law but that unlike traditional international law, it did not merely grant rights to states. 112 Moreover, early in its history, the IACHR held that international law obligated states and granted to individuals the authority to hold states to compliance. 113 In doing so, the Court struck down state efforts to circumvent this obligation. According to Pasqualucci, the Court allowed fundamental human rights to develop and expand over time. Instead of interpreting rights as they existed when the Court was established, it considered rights within the legal framework at the time of interpretation. 114 Another crucial element of the Court"s jurisprudence, according to Pasqualucci, is that it has held that certain fundamental human rights are non-derogable, even in times of emergency. The Court has refused to allow states to reserve recognition of these fundamental rights. The Court also equips victims to seek justice by protecting their safety while they are in litigation. This occurs directly and indirectly. In the direct approach, litigants can ask the IACHR for "provisional measures" if they believe they are in danger or that witnesses are being threatened. 118 The Court will often issue these "provisional measures" ordering, for example, the state to provide armed security to litigants. The indirect element of safety that comes from litigating before the IACHR arises as a result of the publicity surrounding these cases. Defendants are less likely to attack or threaten a litigant if they are known internationally. NGOs working within the system foster this.
Adrianna Beltran, an activist with WOLA coordinated the public relations effort during the Mack case. In an interview, she explained that "when [the Mack family"s] lawyer was receiving a number of threats -right before the case actually went to trial - [Helen] called me and said we"re receiving threats and everybody was on the phone with the state department, with the embassy, with members of congress or their staff, saying please call and tell them that you"re really concerned." 119 In this effort, Ms. Beltran observed, "we were sending the message that she was not alone." 120 
C. Condemning Human Rights Violations
For more than 20 years Guatemala blocked all attempts to punish those responsible for the Plan de Sanchez massacre of 268 Mayan Guatemalans (see above).
Then in 2004, the IACHR ruled that Guatemala was responsible not only for the massacre but for denying justice to the victims and families for these many years. In addition to financial compensation, Guatemala was ordered to conduct a public apology.
On July 18, 2005, exactly 23 years after the massacre, Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo Stein traveled to Plan de Sanchez to formally apologize for the killings before the families and survivors of the victims. In his remarks, Stein conceded that the army had "unleashed bloodshed and fire to wipe out an entire community." 121 He observed that the "people want moments that commemorate their victims, but more than anything, they don't want what happened to keep being denied officially." 122 The IACHR recognizes the significance of its rulings as the sole voice of justice after years of impunity. In its judgments, therefore, the IACHR goes beyond traditional reparations and includes provisions to amplify the impact of its decisions. Often this takes the form of a mandated, public apology such as the event described above. In one of his first official acts as President, Oscar Berger publicly apologized for the murder of
Myrna Mack pursuant to an IACHR demand. President Berger apologized to Myrna
Mack"s sister and daughter and to the Guatemalan people in a ceremony broadcast on national television and held in front of the military and other dignitaries.
As the IACHR hearing began in the Carpio case, the president of the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission asked to address the Court. He stood, faced the families of the victims, admitted that the state was responsible for the murder of Carpio and his associates, and asked for forgiveness. When each family member testified, counsel for the state opened his remarks by apologizing for the state"s actions. 123 Soraya Long, the CEJIL lawyer representing the families, commented in an interview that "It is extremely important that the state has recognized its responsibility -this is a very significant stepit is a very important gesture that the state asked for pardon from the victims." 124 Ms.
Long explained "For more than ten years the families of the victims have said the murder of my husband, my father, was political -and the state said no, no … and now finally they have said you were right, you were right."
D. Addressing a Broad Class of Victims with Individual Cases
A primary critique of the IACHR levied by Posner and Yoo is that the Court resolves very few cases. While this critique certainly has merit and the IACHR would have a broader effect if it decided more cases, it is a somewhat misleading measure by which to assess this Court. The IACHR must, after all, preserve its precarious legitimacy September 11, 1990, she was studying the displacement of thousands of indigenous
Guatemalans. As an anthropologist with international notoriety, Mack"s findings were embarrassing to those in power, many of whom were complicit in the disappearances.
The case, therefore, is symbolic of several of the deepest wounds inflicted during the 30-year civil war. Because of Myrna Mack"s work, the case symbolized the effort to reveal the truth about the thousands of Mayan Guatemalans killed during the war. Also, because the state made every effort to block justice in the case, the result was a victory over the rampant impunity plaguing Guatemala. Myrna Mack"s sister Helen testified before the IACHR that the "case is a paradigmatic one not only for her family but also for many Guatemalans who see themselves reflected in it" and that by litigating it she was "representing, with dignity, the thousands of victims who had no chance." Indeed it was clear that the IACHR realized these implications in handling these cases. Instead of merely awarding reparations the Court frequently requires the state take concrete steps to address the broad class of victims not included in the case. It sets out to attack broad problems through individual cases. CEJIL lawyer, Soraya Long, argued in an interview that "the court uses its judgments to break systemic and structural failings and solve the macro problems" facing nations under its jurisdiction. 132 In the Carpio case, the Court also assessed remedies designed to address weaknesses in Guatemala. For example, in addition to traditional compensatory damages, the Court ordered the state to take concrete steps to prevent similar violations. 133 In its ruling, the Court targeted the widespread, systematic impunity ordering a full investigation to identify and punish those responsible for planning and carrying out the attack and the subsequent obstruction of justice. 134 For example, the Court ordered the state to remove all "obstacles and mechanisms … that maintain impunity" and to provide security for all witnesses, judges and prosecutors. 135 According to the order all information discovered in the investigation must be made public because the victims, their families and the Guatemalan people, the Court stressed, have "a right to the truth." 136 The Court stretched its authority even further and ruled that to the extent legislation may have granted the attackers amnesty, it is invalid because such laws violate the victims" rights to justice and the truth. 137 
E. Creating an Historical Record
Recognizing the victims" story and enshrining it in the judicial record are essential parts of achieving justice for human rights violations. 138 In these cases, the state denied responsibility and obstructed any effort to find the truth. To the victims, therefore, the 151 The anguish in the victims" stories was memorialized in the Court"s opinion. In the testimony of a family member, Juan Manuel Jerónimo he says "the following day the bodies of our loved ones were still decomposing when the military commissioners from Chipuerta arrived… They did the most savage of burials and we were no longer able to recognize our relatives."
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The decision also included testimony regarding the impunity entrenched in the Guatemalan legal system. Another family member, Buenaventura Manuel Jerónimo, stated that "the violence, the corruption, and the discrimination against the Indigenous peoples and farmers impeded justice." He continued, "Until this day there are threats against the judges" who hear these cases against the state." 153 Through this testimony in front of the IACHR Guatemala"s violent past and present were finally given a voice.
The IACHR is effective in setting out these histories. In its decisions the hechos probados sections are extensive memorializing the victims" stories, the violations and the impunity. For example, in the Carpio case, the IACHR including an account of Mr.
Carpio"s work for Guatemalan democracy through his government service, political activism and leadership of the newspaper "El Grafico." 154 CEJIL"s Soraya Long stressed the importance of establishing a historical record. She commented in an interview that "Carpio"s work exists in the fabric of Guatemala -in acts of the assembly, in articles of the constitution -his family demands that their father -their husband -be included in the history of his country." 155 
Conclusions -Impact of the Inter-American Court
Our analysis demonstrates that the Inter-American Court is a valuable factor promoting human rights accountability and reconciliation in Latin America. (See Table   1 ). It is a powerful voice of accountability in a region struggling to fully democratize.
By holding states accountable it demonstrates to citizens that overcoming impunity is There are several critiques that may be levied at the Inter-American system.
Posner and Yoo correctly point out that the IACHR hears very few cases and that compliance rates are questionable. 157 Rescia and Seitles argue that the delay in processing cases, along with procedural deficiencies and normative problems, are significant failings of the system. 158 One can see support for this in the Carpio casewhich was filed in 1994 and resolved in 2004. Indeed these critiques have some merit and this essay is not intended to refute them. On the contrary, we conclude that even with these weaknesses the IACHR is still indispensable in aiding reconciliation and democratization for the post-conflict democracies in Latin America. The system would be even more effective if it addressed many of the concerns voiced by critics.
In post-conflict democracies, domestic courts struggle for legitimacy, resources and a meaningful role in their state"s political discourse. However, as arms of the state they often share the state"s interest in quieting efforts to uncover past atrocities.
Moreover, they are frequently subject to influence from the other political powers. 159 When litigants are able to reach beyond the state for justice, they escape this institutional deck heavily stacked against them.
Human rights observers often note the effect of the IACHR"s work. For example, Helio Bicudo credits the Court"s rulings with helping Peru restore democracy and the integrity of its judiciary after President Fujimori"s attempt to circumvent constitutional constraints. 163 During the Carpio hearing, Silvia Villacorta, the wife of one of the victims, told the Court that "in Guatemala there is no justice so we must look to international justice."
"We want," she told the judges, "a precedent that future generations can look to." 164 While the institutions and procedures of the Inter-American Court need strengthening, it is a positive -and necessary -force for human rights accountability on the region. It offers victims like Silvia Villacorta the justice she deserved. 
